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There has been a recent surge in attention to the phenomena of under-
representation of various groups in academic philosophy. The conference on 
Under-represented Groups in Philosophy held at Cardiff University on No-
vember 26th and 27th 2010 was intended as a forum to enable a better under-
standing of the problems surrounding under-representation in philosophy, and 
to examine the philosophical under-pinnings of strategies for overcoming un-
der-representation and its attendant problems. The conference attracted 
speakers and participants mostly from the Anglophone world including the 
UK, US, Canada and Australia. All the talks were recorded and podcasts are  
freely available at: http://www.cf.ac.uk/encap/newsandevents/events/ con-
ferences/groups.ht 
The conference venue was fully accessible to individuals with mobility im-
pairments; all talks were translated in American and British sign language and 
interpreters were also present at the conference dinner. Finally, crèche facili-
ties were available upon request to the organisers. One of the outcomes of the 
conference has been sustained attention to the question of how to organise 
conferences and workshops so that they are inclusive and accessible.1 
The first talk Women and Deviance in Philosophy was delivered by Helen 
Beebee who at the time was the president of the British Philosophical Associa-
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tion (an association representing the interests of professional philosophers in 
the UK). Beebee presented the data gathered by the BPA on the numbers of 
women in philosophy.2 These data revealed a steady drop in the representation 
of women in philosophy in the UK. The percentage of women drops from 47% 
of the undergraduate student body to just 15% at professorial level. Data has 
not yet been gathered on disabled philosophers or black and ethnic minority 
philosophers, but there is reason to believe the problems are no less stark.3 
Beebee also introduced the BPA report on the status of women in the profes-
sion which has been distributed to all the heads of philosophy departments in 
the UK and which  includes a set of recommendations on how to address the 
issue of under-representation.4 In addition to presenting these data, Beebee 
also offered some possible explanations for the under-representation of wom-
en. Among these she noticed a certain tendency for under-representation to 
self-perpetuate. When members of a group are perceived as statistically rare 
within a population, they also tend to be conceived as defective exemplars with-
in the population. Thus, for instance, Beebee notes that an aggressive and con-
frontational style of argumentation is dominant in philosophy seminars. The 
kind of behaviour that is often accepted in this context would be unacceptable 
in most other social circumstances; and there is no good reason why it should 
be adopted in philosophy. Further, she suggested, this style may put women 
off. It does this, independently of whether as a matter of fact women dislike 
aggression and confrontation. Rather, because this kind of behaviour is cultur-
ally associated with masculinity, its adoption sends the message that philoso-
phy is a masculine pursuit. Hence, the message that women are atypical philos-
ophers is re-enforced. 
Whether the way in which philosophy is perceived has a role in perpetuat-
ing under-representation was a question considered by Dr Pamela Hood and 
Dr Mahlet Zimeta. Their papers both addressed the value of studying philoso-
phy. Hood addressed the perception, prevalent among the students at San 
Francisco State University (USA) where she teaches, that philosophy is a ‘white 
thing’ and thus both too hard and irrelevant for ethnic minority and underprivi-
 
2For an overview, see the BPA 2010 newsletter, available here: 
http://www.bpa.ac.uk/category/news/newsletters/. More information is also available here: 
http://www.bpa.ac.uk/policies/ 
3 See, for example, Gines, 2011.   
4Available at: http://www.swipuk.org/notices/2011-09-08/Women%20in%20Philosophy%20in  
%20the%20UK%20%28BPASWIPUK%20Report%29.pdf. 
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leged students. Hood described her numerous strategies to address this per-
ception by teaching philosophy in a way that made its relevance to student’s 
lives apparent. She discussed for instance the influence of ancient Greek philo-
sophical thought on Martin Luther King’s ideas. Hood showed how one can 
make philosophy relevant to everyday concerns in one’s teaching, and argued 
for the importance of challenging the stereotype of philosophy as ‘abstract and 
irrelevant’ in addressing the pipeline problems of retaining BME students in 
philosophy. She also emphasised the way in which this engagement with phi-
losophy in relation to real life could in turn be empowering for students.   
Zimeta also identified a concern about the way in which philosophy may be 
perceived, and advocated a change in the way philosophy is conceived by its 
practitioners so that it can become more attractive to students from underprivi-
leged backgrounds. As it stands, she argued, philosophy is not thought of as an 
aspirational degree choice by these potential students who aim to be socially 
mobile and gain more social power. At the root of this disinterest, she argued, 
is a conception of philosophy as lacking in social utility. This is a conception 
which is re-enforced by professional philosophers who emphasise philosophy’s 
intrinsic value rather than also its instrumental value for social advancement. 
To remedy this problem Zimeta proposes a change of focus in favour of the role 
that studying philosophy can play as a way out of poverty, by providing access 
to skills and qualifications that equip individuals for a range of fulfilling em-
ployments. 
These explanations for under-representation rely on hypotheses about stu-
dents’ views about philosophy, and places the onus on those working in educa-
tional environments to think carefully about the image of the discipline that is 
projected. Such stereotypes about what philosophy is, and indeed ‘who does 
philosophy’, play a central role in other attempts to articulate the root causes of 
under-representation. A number of papers drew upon the emerging research 
on implicit bias in some detail.  
Professor Jenny Saul, in Unconscious Biases and Women in Philosophy set 
out data on implicit biases that we might expect to hinder the progress and in-
clusion of women and minorities in philosophy - for example, the propensity to 
rate less positively CV’s when they bear women’s names. There is also the data 
emerging from research on “stereotype threat”; the phenomena of under-
performance due to raised stress levels at the prospect of confirming negative 
stereotypes. The data on these two phenomena, Saul argued, provide good 
reason to suppose that some procedures in philosophy do not meet the re-
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quirements for equality of opportunity. For example, if in hiring procedures 
women and minorities are not evaluated equally, nor compete under the same 
conditions (due to stereotype threat) as candidates from groups that are not 
under-represented, then such procedures, Saul argues, do not adhere to prin-
ciples of fair equality of opportunity. In her paper (available online5), some 
proposals for mitigating bias are considered. 
As Saul acknowledges, none of the data gathered has been about philoso-
phers, and although there is reason to suppose that philosophers are as liable 
to implicit bias as anyone else, the premises of her argument could be bolstered 
if data were to show that philosophers do harbour implicit biases, and that 
these are of the kind that could feature in (partial) explanations for the under-
representation of women and minorities in philosophy. Moreover, greater un-
derstanding of the nature of implicit bias, and the kinds of cognitive architec-
ture that support the elimination or mitigation of biases, should further help in 
equipping individuals and institutions with proposals for how to avoid biased 
responses. Much of this work will be empirical, but there is much conceptual 
and philosophical work also to be done (what is implicit bias? what epistemic 
responsibilities might individuals have in relation to bias?). 
Implicit bias and stereotype threat might contribute to the (likely) complex 
factors that would figure in a full explanation of why some groups are under-
represented in philosophy. Professor Louise Antony, in her paper Different 
Voices or Perfect Storm? Explaining the dearth of women in philosophy, takes 
up another explanation that has recently been offered by Stich and Buckwalter, 
on the basis of data garnered from experimental philosophy.6 On this hypothe-
sis (one of a range of “Different Voice” hypotheses advanced in recent dec-
ades), women may have systematically discordant intuitions, in response to 
thought experiments. Might this explain the attrition rate of women in philoso-
phy?  
Antony argued that serious methodological problems beset the claims from 
Stich and Buckwalter: for example, the effects (discordant intuitions) were 
found in only some of the experiments analysed, and in as many experiments 
men were found to have discordant intuitions. So the hypothesis does not ap-
 
5J. Saul, “Unconscious Influences and Women in Philosophy”, 
http://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/the-psychology-of-philosophy/ 
6Stich & Buckwalter, 2010, “Gender and Philosophical Intuition”, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1683066. 
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pear to fit the data. (It is also worth noting that no support has been garnered 
for this hypothesis in relation to disabled or BME philosophers.) 
Moreover, Antony argues, there is significant damage in pursuing this hy-
pothesis any further: claims about differences, she suggests, tend to be under-
stood as categorical, and can fuel essentialising claims that have served to mar-
ginalise women. So pursuing this hypothesis could have dangerous effects. A 
rival hypothesis, to which research funding would be better directed, is the 
“Perfect storm” hypothesis, according to which various effects converge and 
intensify to marginalise and exclude women from philosophy (an example 
would be that of implicit bias and stereotype threat, mentioned above). 
It is worth noting that the different voice hypothesis is not, strictly speak-
ing, inconsistent with the perfect storm hypothesis: one part of the perfect 
storm could be that women have discordant intuitions. If true, then the dan-
gerous effects would be ones that would require care to be managed (by ex-
plaining that it is fallacious to move from claims about statistical differences to 
categorical ones). But Antony’s argument is in part pragmatic: given that re-
search funding is limited, which should we bet on? The methodological con-
cerns raised with Stich and Buckwalter’s paper support the conclusion that we 
should jettison the different voice hypothesis as a main line of inquiry. 
The explanations for under-representation, therefore, are likely to be com-
plex and subtle, and will likely include reference to ‘micro-inequities’ of the 
sort highlighted by Professor Samantha Brennan in her paper, ‘Re-thinking the 
Moral Significance of Micro-Inequities’. The cumulative effect of small deficits 
in recognition and support can be significant, Brennan argues, drawing, for 
example, on the work of Haslanger7, Wylie, and the MIT Barnard Report on 
Women, Work and the Academy. 
Brennan highlights the extent to which such micro-inequities have been 
overlooked in moral and political philosophy, which have often focused on 
“evils”8, or “absolute rights”9, or have focused on actions that are themselves 
wrong10 rather than on unjust outcomes that may result from small acts which 
are not, individually, wrong. Highlighting those thinkers who have attended to 
 
7 Haslanger, 2008; Wylie, 2011; Barnard Centre for Research on Women report, Wylie, Jakobsen,  
Fosado, 2007. 
8 Card, 2002. 
9 Fried, 1974. 
10 Nozick, 1974. 
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small harms in their moral philosophy,11 Brennan calls for more attention to 
such harms in moral theory, as well as further attention to the possible ways of 
addressing micro-inequities. Amongst the positive proposals Brennan consid-
ers, are those of engaging in “micro-affirmations” – small acts of support – and 
the importance of bystander training, which equips individuals to become “ac-
tive bystanders” who can play a role in de-escalating hostile situations.  
These instructive positive proposals again call for further analysis: if small 
harms are to be incorporated into moral theory, might individuals have duties 
to avoid them, or to mitigate them? Is it ever appropriate to hold individuals 
liable to blame for small harms (Brennan seems to suggest not)? 
Not all explanations of under-representation need appeal only to micro-
inequities, when larger obstacles are all too apparent. Whilst the three papers 
by Saul, Antony and Brennan offered theoretical accounts of the subtle causes 
of under-representation of women in the profession, and presented sugges-
tions on how to overcome the problems, Teresa Blankmeyer-Burke’s talk 
aimed to present some of the issues faced by the Deaf community in Academia. 
In particular, Blankmeyer-Burke recounted some of her experiences as a deaf 
philosopher. The ability to access only partially resources that others take for 
granted was one of the focuses of her talk. She noted, for instance, that very few 
presenters when using powerpoint take into account the fact that deaf people 
must look at their interpreter in sign language when the talk is delivered and 
consequently cannot look at the slides. But partiality of access is also the result 
of poor interpreting facilities provided at conferences. Blankmeyer-Burke ex-
plained that under budgetary pressures conference organisers often tend to 
provide a minimal interpreting service. For instance, they provide cheaper less 
experienced interpreters for the business part of meetings and offer no provi-
sion for the social part. As everybody knows, the latter is often among the most 
intellectually satisfying components of conferences. A consequence of the par-
tiality of this access leaves deaf academics unable to participate fully in academ-
ic life, whilst their demands for better provisions are taken to be excessive. As 
it was remarked during the conference, it is important to remember that poor 
provision results in a two-way loss. The deaf academic is denied full access to 
others’ views and presence but other participants lose the opportunity to bene-
fit from the views and company of the deaf participants. This talk was the cata-
lyst for action soliciting various scholarly funding bodies in the UK to ring-
 
11 Parfit, 1984; Kernohan, 1998. 
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fence funding to help organisers make their conferences fully inclusive. This 
call has now been answered by some sponsoring bodies such as the Analysis 
Trust and the Mind Association. 
The conference was extremely successful, and received attention in the 
press. “The Philosophers’ Magazine” for instance published a long report on 
the conference. It is particularly pleasing to note that the conference has also 
served as a catalyst for positive action by the BPA, scholarly associations and 
the society of women in philosophy in the UK. 
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